David Teira
Dpt. of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science (UNED) and Urrutia Elejalde Foundation In this paper I explore a positivist methodological tradition in early demand theory, as exemplified by several common traits that I draw from the works of V. Pareto, H. L. Moore and H. Schultz. Assuming a current approach to explanation in the social sciences, I will discuss the building of their various explanans, showing that the three authors agreed on two distinctive methodological features: the exclusion of any causal commitment to psychology when explaining individual choice and the mandate to test the truth of demand theory on aggregate data by statistical means. However, I also contend, from an epistemological point of view, that the truth of demand theory was conceived of in three different ways by our authors. Inspired by Poincaré, Pareto assumed that many different theories could account for the same data on individual choice, coming close to a kind of conventionalism -though I prefer to refer to this position as theoreticism. Moore was himself akin to Pearson's approach, which could be named descriptivist insofar as it resolved scientific laws into statistical descriptions of the data. Finally, Schultz tried to reconcile both approaches in an adequationist stance with no success, as we shall see. been suggested that a different positivist tradition may be found in economics, underlying certain developments in demand theory in the 1920s ii . In this paper, I will try to elaborate on this suggestion, which I will pursue through a collection of texts not usually related to positivism. My overall purpose is to infer therefrom a definition of positivist methodology as exercised by early demand theorists, whilst shedding some light on the epistemological challenges they had to face.
A consensual point in most textbooks on the philosophy of the social sciences (at least in the analytic tradition: e.g., Rosenberg 1995) is that a proper explanation of a social event should consist of an intentional account of the decision of the individual agent and an analysis of the aggregate effects that result from adding such decisions. Demand theory might be considered canonical in this respect for providing both explanatory ingredients, utility theory articulating the former and partial or general equilibrium the latter. However, this methodological consensus allows for a variety of positions when it comes to the empirical testing of the explanations so construed. That is, to the assesment of the truth of the underlying theories. In this paper, I will defend the existence of two common methodological and epistemological features that appear in the explanations of demand provided by three leading economists of the first part of the 20 th century (V. Pareto, H. L.
Moore and H. Schultz) and define a common position that I take to be distinctively positivist.
The first feature was to dispense with unobservable psychological variables at the micro level driven by the commitment of attaining plainly empirical explanations of individual choices in demand analyses. The status of utility theory was therefore questioned and several methodological decisions were then due ranging from an ordinalist reform (Pareto and Schultz) to its abandonment (Moore) . On the epistemological side, the second distinctive feature of these three authors is their option for the assesment of the truth value of demand theory at the macro level, statistically testing the explanations of aggregate market data. Though experimentation at the micro level was sometimes entertained, our three economists were probably fascinated by the possibility of uncovering the laws of the market by means of the new statistical tools that became available at the turn of the century.
I describe this position as positivist on the basis of the methodological and epistemological proximity that might be appreciated between the positivist tradition in 19 th century physics and our economic trio. Namely, dispensing with the mechanistic analysis of the unobservable behaviour of individual atoms and analyse instead its aggregation by means of statistics. I will argue that this proximity is quite noticeable if some attention is paid to the influence received from Henri Poincaré and Karl Pearson by, respectively, Pareto and Moore. I refer to the common position of these two authors and Schultz as the source of a tradition as a hypothesis on the possibility of tracing their influence on later demand theorists, though this is a historical endeavour that I will not pursue in this paper -just as I will not explain the convergence of the positions of Pareto, Moore and Schultz as a result of their mutual relations (though obvious in the case of the las two). However, I
hope that my case is informed enough as not to be unpalatable for the historian.
My main concern is philosophical: the methodological and philosophical dilemmas these three authors had to face in their analyses of demand (observability, underdetermination, ceteris paribus clauses, etc.) were objectively there. In particular, I will try to show how they took different positions in respect of truth, discussing whether an independent correspondence between theory and empirical data could be established the deduction of theory from facts, in order to show how the two methodological tenets that will identify the positivist tradition in demand theory derive thereof.
Let us recall several basic Paretian tenets. The demand theorist abstracted from the agent's behaviour a certain pattern of action, in which means and ends are logically connected. The theorist was to produce a mathematical idealization of this logic, by means of which he could approximate reality through formal correspondences (Pareto [1909] 1981: 11). Scientific truth is attained when the structure of a set of concepts is in complete accord with the relations underlying certain phenomenon (Pareto [1909] every theoretical entity in physics -atoms, for instance-is to be reinterpreted on the basis of sense data. Far from representing real causal links, as the mechanists claimed, the mathematical apparatus articulating those concepts in laws turns out to be an empirically fruitful convention, freely chosen by the theoretician. Therefore, the formal structure of every theory may be interpreted in many different ways inasmuch as it succeeds in expressing how the phenomena relate to each other vi .
When arguing for the explanations of individual action based on utility theory, Pareto seems to be inspired by Poincaré's suggestion, which he explicitly quotes vii . Just as the equations of celestial mechanics may be considered true even after renouncing universal 8 gravitation, so utility theory is to be founded independently of any substantive interpretation whatsoever (Pareto [1909 (Pareto [ ] 1981 . More precisely:
[I]n that case it is possible that, in order to make things a little more concise, some people might think it appropriate to give some name to the quantity I; thus in mechanics it was considered appropriate to give the name kinetic energy to a certain integral, and the name entropy to another in thermodynamics. the explanation of individual action should be kept apart from psychology, avoiding the search for inner unobservable causes and focusing instead on the logic of observable behavioral routines. The road to experimental testing in economics was thus open (Pareto [1909 (Pareto [ ] 1981 [1900 ). Yet, Pareto raised a most challenging epistemological issue when he contended that many different theories may perform equally well to account for a given body of data, as Poincaré was already claiming (Pareto [1909] 1981: 44 Statistical testing was an entirely natural move for a positivist in economics, as it had been in physics, since it departed from mechanistic explanations based on individual behaviour and used random variables to account for aggregate data (Barbut 1999: 106-107) . In fact, Pareto expected statistics to produce new «empirical laws» which could be somehow compared to the theoretical ones (Pareto [1907 (Pareto [ -8] 1982 . In spite of the relevance of his contributions to statistics, this was again a merely programmatic claim, since he never tested demand theory on the data. Therefore, he left unanswered a question that Moore and Schultz were to raise inmediately: did his conventionalist caveat also apply at the macro level? In other words, were the aggregate demand curves also underdetermined by the data? I will discuss now Moore's and Schultz's response to both questions. refused to consider other form of causal necessity than the inferential cogency imposed by the correlation coefficient (Pearson 1900: 283-84; 1911: 310-11 ).
HENRY LUDWELL MOORE'S STATISTICAL
For Pearson it was not simply a matter of epistemological principle. Inspired by Galton and Weldon, he really dispensed with mechanistic explanation in his own biological research (Pearson 1900: 332) . Statistics could solve the problem of causal analysis of natural selection, overcoming the debate on the causal mechanism of genetic inheritance (Pearson 1900: ch. 10 ): according to Pearson, the ancestral law of heredity was hailed as being the biological analogue of the universal law of gravitation. The biometrician would obtain a type for each organ of a plant or an animal, estimating its statistical concentration in a given population (Armatte 1995: 524) . Hence, each individual organ can be analysed in terms of its deviation from the type (Pearson 1900: 384) . Assuming a certain statistical distribution for a type, the biometrician would measure by means of correlation analysis the intergenerational variation of its parameters in order to analyse the effects of natural selection on an organ. According to Pearson, the bigger the concentration around the mean of each type, the more intensive the struggle for life. Correlating the measures of each particular organ in a progenitor and its offspring the biometrician would be able to assess its role in natural selection, no matter how it were inherited.
Struggle for life was a significant economic metaphor long before Henry Ludwell
Moore started to work on the distribution of wages, the topic of his 1896 dissertation at Johns Hopkins, advised by John Bates Clark. Many American economists of the time were discussing how to account for the distribution of entrepreneurial profits and workers' salaries in a neoclassical setting. Moore's supervisor contributed to the debate with his The Distribution of Wealth, in which he successfully introduced a distinction between a static and a dynamic approach (Dewey 1987: 430) xii . According to Clark, most classical (Clark 1899: vi) and neoclassical economists explained the distribution of wages statically, in a deductive fashion. His own analysis proceeded along this path, though he announced that the best research prospects lay ahead in the development of the dynamic approach, an inductive verification of the static results (Clark, 1905: 256) .
After completing his dissertation, Moore devoted fifteen more years to the analysis of wages. It seems that Moore assumed the execution of Clark's project xiii , but, as we will see, it was Marshall who inspired a number of crucial steps to accomplishing it. This was done when Moore's Laws of Wages went to print in 1911, although a series of three papers published in 1907 had already anticipated its main results. Aiming at a statistical testing of the «pure» theories of wages (Moore 1907c: 61; 1907a: 638) , Moore developed an inductive approach anchored in the Pearsonian concept of variability (Moore 1907c: 62) .
«Guided by the experience» of the biometricians (Moore 1907c: 63) , Moore found in the standard deviation of wages an index of the social struggle for life. According to Moore, the variability of wages points to changes in the conditions under which workers compete with each other for jobs, even if the average salary remains constant (Moore 1907c: 64 (Moore 1908: 33) . There is nothing more akin to economics than statistics, claimed Moore, if the former was to be «an engine for the discovery of concrete truth»:
Similarly, the theory of probability as applied to the social sciences is not a body of concrete doctrine, but rather a machinery of general application in the study of mass-phenomena upon which social sciences rest. (Moore 1908 According to the view of the foremost theorists, the development of the doctrines of utility and value had laid the foundations of scientific economics in exact concepts, and it would soon be possible to erect upon the new foundation a firm structure of interrelated parts which, in definitiveness and cogency, would be suggestive of the severe beauty of the mathematico-physical sciences. But this expectation has not been realized. (Moore [1914 (Moore [ ] 1967 According to Moore, economists had been mislead in their search for scientific laws by a sort of physics' envy (Moore [1914 (Moore [ ] 1967 Mirowski 1990: 596-97) . If utility theory cannot be accurately translated into statistical terms, it should be discarded as the basis for demand analysis, and replaced by a purely functional approach -as claimed by
Mach-linking quantities and prices such as the one advanced by Cournot (Le Gall 1996).
There is no need of an inquiry into the agent's market decisions, if one assumes that he follows certain routines (Schultz 1938: 65) , as those pointed out by Pearson. These routines will be sufficient to generate regularities in the aggregate data. Moore certainly now fulfils the two methodological criteria defining positivism: no psychological commitments in the explanation of individual demand, but mere behavioral routines, and statistical search for the laws of demand at the aggregate level. This simply implied the rejection of neoclassical demand theory, replaced by a purely descriptive approach to data analysis in which scientific truth was statistically appraised.
The consequences of Moore's option for this descriptivist stance are extremely noticeable in Economic cycles. In fact, having dispensed with utility theory, there was no need to expect a single law of demand, such as the universal one hypothesized by Marshall:
As we proceed we shall find that the law of demand for some commodities does indeed conform to the type of curve which has just been described, but it will be a part of the work of the next chapter to show that the doctrine of the uniformity of the demand function is an idol of the static state -of the method of ceteris paribus-which has stood in the way of the successful treatment of concrete dynamic problems. (Moore [1914 (Moore [ ] 1967 Here lies the key to understanding Moore's most controversial result: his positively sloped demand curve. Moore took the production of pig-iron as «a barometer of trade», pointing to the industrial cycle, in order to analyse whether it was somehow related to the agricultural cycle, as represented by the yield per acre of certain crops. He found a positive correlation between both cycles for lags of various intervals xviii , and then argued as follows:
Upon the assumption that all demand curves are of the negative type, it would be impossible for general prices to fall while the yield per acre of crops is decreasing.
In consequence of the decrease in the yield per acre, the price of crops would ascend, the volume of commodities represented by pig-iron would decrease, and upon the hypothesis of the universality of the descending type of demand curves, the prices of commodities like pig-iron would rise. In a period of declining yield of crops, therefore, there would be a rise of prices, and in a period of increasing yield of crops there would be a fall of prices. But the facts are exactly the contrary. (Schultz 1931a: 653; 1938: 82) According to Mary Morgan, there are two alternative approaches in discussing
Moore's controversial curve (Morgan 1990: 167-68 Council (SSRC), economics was making its way into the Big Sciences (Hands and Mirowski 1997) . At a time when statistics was a discipline almost unknown to the profession, the more attractive quantitative analysis became, the more it was funded.
However, there were many who felt that economics was being downgraded into mere political arithmetic -as the Marshallian Jacob Viner once put it-by «the mere mechanical search for mutual dependencies among data selected almost at random» (Viner 1928: 33) . The enthusiasts of correlation analysis could not pretend not to hear. Henry Schultz was one of the most prominent among them.
Schultz had been trained as an economist by Mitchell and Moore at Columbia, and was to go on to obtain a position at Chicago. Under the patronage of the SSRC, Schultz contributed to creating and directing a statistical laboratory (Hotelling 1939: 98) , whose facilities met the most demanding standards of the time (Mitchell 1925: 22) . The conditions were ideal to undertake Viner's challenge and «bridge the gap between factless theory and theoryless fact» (Yntema 1939: 159) . In other words, to reconcile Moore's statistical approach with neoclassical demand analysis.
Having visited Pearson at the Galton Laboratory in 1919, Schultz was certainly familiar with his epistemology and how Moore, his doctoral advisor, had applied it to economics. Schultz adhered indeed to a functional approach to causation (Schultz 1927a: 706) and argued for a statistical appraisal of ceteris paribus clauses (Schultz 1925: 462; 1928a) and demand theory as a whole (Schultz 1931a: 660) . However, he was also plainly explicit in admitting that general equilibrium theory «is the only type of scientific theory we have» (Schultz 1928b: 647) , which is not so unpredictable a statement from a devoted reader of Pareto, such as Schultz was from the very beginning of his career (Hotelling 1939: 99; Yntema 1939: 155-56 I will discuss Schultz's initial project in two steps: its enactment and its subsequent crisis. Schultz's studies realized his adequationist agenda for a brief five-year period. The debate on the theoretical significance of statistical demand curves sparked off by Elmer
Working brought it to an abrupt close. Let me proceed again from the micro to the macro level. It was at the former where Schultz had to answer Moore's objections to utility theory, basically its statistical irrelevance (Moore [1914 (Moore [ ] 1967 . To tackle this, the obvious way for a disciple of both Pareto and Mitchell working hand in hand with quantitative psychologists -such as Louis Thurstone, who would later contribute to the establishment of the Psychometric Society-was to turn towards experimentation (Schultz 1925: 631; 1931b: 487-89) . The Psychometric Laboratory at the same Social Sciences Building in Chicago hosted their attempt to obtain an experimental indifference curve in the early 1930s (Schultz 1938: 15) xxi . According to Dorothy Ross (1991: 401) , this interdisciplinary approach was typical of the SSRC scientists, and it did not imply that economics were to be somehow reduced to psychology (Schultz 1933b: 115) . In fact Schultz did not proceed further along this path, as his methodological point was already made. Utility theory may be hence empirically tested, meeting the strict positivist requirements of Pareto and Moore:
it did not refer to any psychological unobservable magnitude, and was therefore statistically
testable.
Yet, Schultz acknowledged that most agents would not probably know how to answer when interviewed by the experimentalist about their preferences regarding different combinations of quantities and prices. That is, the truth of demand theory, as the positivist claimed, did not lie at the micro level: to obtain empirical demand functions, the theorist should observe how consumers behave in masses (Schultz 1931a: 649) . Individual actions, even if not fully logical in a Paretian sense, give rise to collective routines of change (Schultz 1928b: 643) amenable to a statistical analysis.
Once it was established that the laws of demand were theoretically well-grounded at the micro level, the issue to address was how to contrast demand theory on aggregate data.
Schultz chose to follow Pareto's suggestion (Pareto [1909 (Pareto [ ] 1981 Schultz 1928b: 645) on the practical impossibility of a standard predictive approach, i.e, deriving ex ante a set of equilibrium prices to verify whether it was obtained in a given market. He opted for reconstructing empirical demand curves assisted by Moore's techniques to test whether they exhibited the properties anticipated by the theory (in particular, those concerning the sign of the slope and the elasticity). Although meeting the positivist desideratum of contrasting economic theories on aggregate data by statistical means, Schultz clearly departed from Pareto's epistemological stance. For now the issue at stake was not to choose a theoretical account for a certain data set, as Pareto had intended: there was a single theory of demand to contrast, and the way to do it was to verify the correspondence between the properties of the statistical and the theoretical demand curves. Here is what Schultz's adequationism consists of.
As Moore clearly anticipated, the most difficult problem to handle was that of fitting a dynamic sequence of price data into a single static curve, as if the market conditions remained constant during the period considered, i.e., assuming that the curve does not shift xxii . Schultz initially thought that the statistical smoothing of those time series would be enough so to dispense with ceteris paribus clauses, as Moore taught (Schultz 1928b: 648) xxiii . His doctoral dissertation on the demand for sugar exemplifies Schultz's opening approach: to eliminate shifts caused by changes in the general price level or by the rising popularity of sugar as a consumption good, it was enough to apply trend ratios or link relatives to the data (Schultz 1925: 502) . However, Moore's techniques were not intended to deal with neoclassical demand curves, as Schultz was soon forced to
acknowledge. Yet, statistics offered alternative ways to cope with shifts xxiv , such as those which Holbrook Working had already advanced. According to the elder Working, the shifting of a curve would produce a distribution of points scattered as if an error occurred in measuring the variable (Working 1925: 531) . As measurement errors could be reduced by means of orthogonal regressions (Epstein 1987: 42; Schultz 1925: 581) , these would produce a better fitting of the theoretical demand curve. the shifts of the demand and the supply curve were correlated, the statistician would be unable to trace the latter, as its elasticity would be not remain constant from point to point.
According to Working, we will have mere regression curves then, useful for predictive purposes but with no theoretical relevance whatsoever (Working 1927 ).
Philip Wright made a similar case about Schultz's Statistical Laws of Demand and
Supply (Schultz 1928a) , drawing the same conclusion: his analyses would be more of heuristic value than conclusive (Wright 1929: 214 ). Schultz's rejoinder to Working and Wright (Schultz 1930: 29; 1938: 73) accepted their objections unreservedly: only under certain assumptions about the way the curve shifted could the econometrician appraise them. According to Schultz, the assumptions underlying Moore's approach were not of a very different kind, as he expected the data to show certain routines of change (Schultz 1930: 36) . These routines were generated by the variations of prices and quantities in the short run; those happening in the long run will be intractable by means of Moore's smoothing techniques (Schultz 1930: 37 ).
Yet, taking Working's point amounted to much more than a mere restriction in scope of Schultz's approach. It implied a substantial amendment of his epistemological endeavour: «The statistical law may only be approached but never realized in inductive investigations» xxv . In other words, there were no prospects in sight for a dynamic reconstruction (Schultz 1938: 84) of static demand curves. Neither were there for Schultz's adequationism: accepting that the theoretical demand curves could only be approached under certain assumptions derived from the theory itself was tantamount to accepting that the rational acceptance of demand theory will always be underdetermined by any conceivable evidence xxvi . However, throughout the 1930s Schultz attempted to test it, now in a general equilibrium framework where each assumption may be explicitly taken into account. Unfortunately, it was only to discover that it was rationality itself which was put into question by the data (Schultz 1933c: 501) . Auxiliary hypotheses were invoked to prevent this from happening (Schultz 1933c: 507-509; 1938: 599-604) . Instead of a pure statistical reconstruction, he had to settle for a mere theoretically constrained approximation (Schultz 1938, pp.173 ).
CONCLUSION
The works by the three authors examined in this paper exemplify a certain methodological approach to demand theory which I take to be distinctively positivist, even several decades before neopositivism was introduced into economics. For the purpose of this analysis, this older brand of positivism may be understood as a reaction to the causal programme of mechanistic physics, advocating instead a phenomenalistic conception of truth in which causation was reduced to a purely functional dependence. While drawing on different sources, our three demand theoreticians converged on the exclusion of inner Schultz opted for the latter, but unlike Pareto, he could not expect the situation to improve as a result of the advancement of statistical economics. No theoretically independent reconstruction of demand curves could be undertaken or, at least, some among the next generation of demand theorists were soon led to think so. In a controversial paper at the Journal of the American Statistical Association the young George Stigler, a former student of Schultz in Chicago, gave voice to the opinion that statistical demand curves were intrinsically limited. Taking up again the case made by Elmer Working (Stigler 1939: 472-77 ), Stigler added new arguments to get to the same point: nothing but an approximation could be expected from statistical demand curves:
Statistical demand curves are still remote from the demand curves of the economic theorist. In the writer's opinion, the gap between the two types of demand curve will never be completely bridged, and in any case, that rapprochement is likely to be slow. (Stigler 1939: 481) Unlike Schultz, Stigler took this epistemological stance its his logical conclusion, making totally explicit the criteria by which the approximation will be judged:
It is noteworthy that with very few exceptions, the statistical economists have insisted that only "reasonable" results be accepted. "Reasonableness" includes many things, but it seems here to involve primarily a close approximation to a priori expectations. Each procedure has its merits, but it must be remembered that statistical demand curves are published because they do not violate our theoretical preconceptions, and therefore they give a specious authentication of these statistical products. (Stigler 1939: 481) [S]ince the leading workers in the field of statistical demand analysis have generally been competent and frequently outstanding economic theoreticians, they have usually accepted the relevance of theoretical demand curves as criterion of their progress. (Stigler 1939: 470) Whereas Pareto warned of the possibility of having many theoretical accounts for a given body of evidence, so that it can be only approximated but never exhausted through any of them, Stigler argued for a reversed conventionalism: a theoretical entity, such as the demand curve, could be statistically approximated in various ways but never completely reconstructed, and it corresponded to our «theoretical preconception» to evaluate their degree of convergence. As the arch-positivist Milton Friedman once put it, «a theory is the way we perceive "facts", and we cannot perceive "facts" without a theory» (Friedman 1953b: 34) .
A positivist demand theorist in the tradition herein examined will adhere to the two methodological prescriptions discussed above. This commitment did not however entail any particular epistemological stance, and depending on that adopted, the truth of demand theory may be assessed in completely opposite directions. Yet, it must be noted that the main alternatives discussed in our paper involved either rejecting the neoclassical framework (Moore) or accepting to a certain degree its underdetermination by the data (Pareto, Schultz and Stigler vi Cf. Poincaré [1902] 1968, chs. 6, 9 and 11. vii «Moreover, the same facts may be explained by an infinity of theories, all equally true, because they all reproduce the facts to be explained. It is in this sense that Poincaré could say that from the very fact that a phenomenon allows one mechanical explanation, it allows an infinity of them.» (Pareto [1909] 1981: 44 ). Pareto also cited Poincaré's Les méthodes nouvelles de la mécanique céleste (Pareto [1909] 1981: 15).
viii Pareto [1909 ] 1981 : 543-4. Cf. Poincaré [1902 ] 1968 ix Notice that it may be justified in various other ways, as Paul Samuelson did, for instance:
see Bruni and Guala 2001 , where his approach is compared to Pareto's.
x Pareto [1909] 1981: 173. Cf. also Pareto [1911b] xiii By the time Moore published the series of three papers containing his statistical results on wages, Clark stated that a dynamic approach to economics was yet to be attained (Clark 1907: v) . Yet Laws of wages was dedicated to him.
xiv «If the relation between the two is one of cause and effect, that is to say, if the wages of unskilled labourers are determined by the means of subsistence, then the degree of association must approach unity» (Moore [1911 (Moore [ ] 1967 xxii As Mordechai Ezekiel put it: «[A]ll that need to be assumed is that the position of the curve is changing in such a way that the change can be measured and eliminated, so that then at least the shape of the curve, and its position at a specified time, or under specified conditions, may be inferred from the corrected data» (Ezekiel 1928: 212) .
xxiii This is, in my opinion, the proper place to discuss Percy Bridgman's influence on Schultz -against Mirowski 2002: 192: an operational definition of demand based on its measurement procedures cannot be conceived of for him if the action of time is excluded.
The Logic of Modern Physics appeared in 1927, and it is already quoted in Schultz 1928b:
647-48 -and later: see, for instance, Schultz 1930: 17; Schultz 1938: 10-11 xxiv Another instance of Schultz's absolute trust in the power of statistics: Having to account for the different elasticities of demand that could be obtained depending on whether price or quantity was taken as the independent variable in the regression curve, he opted for a statistical rule and chose the variable that enhanced the regression's performance in the Pearsonian χ 2 test (Epstein 1987: 20 The last assertion comes from Moore (Schultz 1925: 630 
